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“Are we not Men?”: Reading the Human-Animal 
Interface in Science Fiction through John Berger’s 
“Why Look at Animals?”
Abstract. The so-called animal turn in literature has fostered the evolution of animal studies, a dis-
cipline aimed at interrogating the ontological, ethical, and metaphysical implications of animal depic-
tions. Animal studies deals with representation and agency in literature, and its insights have funda-
mental implications for understanding the conception and progression of human-animal interactions. 
Considering questions raised by animal studies in the context of literary depictions of animals in sci-
ence fiction, this article threads John Berger’s characterization of the present as a time of radical mar-
ginalization of animals in his essay “Why Look at Animals?” through two highly influential science 
fiction texts: H. G. Wells’s The Island of Doctor Moreau and Philip K. Dick’s Do Androids Dream of 
Electric Sheep?. Applying Berger’s reasoning to these two novels raises issues of personhood, criteria 
for ontological demarcation, and the dynamics of power, providing an opportunity to clarify, modify, 
and refute a number of his finer claims. This process of refinement allows us to track conceptions of 
human-animal interactions through the literary landscape and explore their extrapolations into various 
speculative contexts, including the frontiers of science and post-apocalyptic worlds.
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No, they were not inhuman… They howled, and leaped, and spun, and made horrid faces; 
but what thrilled you was just the thought of their humanity—like yours—the thought of 
your remote kinship with this wild and passionate uproar.
 —Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness (1899, 44)
The stars are dead. The animals will not look. 
We are left alone with our day… 
 —W. H. Auden, “Spain” (1937, 101–02)
In her landmark 1985 essay “A Cyborg Manifesto,” Donna Haraway famously char-
acterized the late 20th century as an epoch of unprecedented ontological disruption, 
cataloguing the fact that “the boundary between human and animal is thoroughly 
breached” as the first of “three crucial boundary breakdowns” defining this modern era 
(Haraway 1985, 119). For Haraway, the disappearance of “animal” as a distinct onto-
logical category was a source of hope, an occasion to imagine a future which “affirm[s] 
the pleasure of connection of human and other living creatures” (Haraway 1985, 119). 
But her initial observation, which will form a recurring theme of this essay, had, at the 
time of her writing, already been read in far less optimistic terms.
Eight years prior to the “Manifesto,” John Berger published “Why Look at Ani-
mals?”, an essay in which he ascribed the disappearance of interspecies interaction 
between humans and animals not, as Haraway did, to the diffusion of an ontological 
boundary that no longer needed to be traversed, but rather to an irreversible banish-
ment of animals from the human world view. “[E]very tradition which has previously 
mediated between man and nature,” Berger claims, “… [has been] broken” (Berger 
1977, 3), resulting in the 20th century’s radical severance from the past. By his ac-
count, this is a severance from a time when animals “were with man at the centre of 
his world” (Berger 1977, 3) and the prevailing dynamic between the two was one of 
mutual ontological construction by way of acknowledged difference: “With their par-
allel lives, animals offer man a companionship which is different from any offered by 
human exchange … a companionship offered to the loneliness of man as a species” 
(Berger 1977, 6). In times of antiquity, Berger argues, animals were accorded a myth-
ical function, invoked in explanations of worldly phenomena and seen as repositories 
of an ancient wisdom such that “a power is ascribed to the animal, comparable with 
human power but never coinciding with it” (Berger 1977, 5). During the mass-indus-
trialization of the 19th century, however, the gradual banishment of animals from the 
ambit of everyday experience undermined the equal footing on which this paradoxical-
ly constructive relationship was built, and, Berger claims, eroded it entirely. Incessant 
marginalization of animals by way of zoos and domestication as pets, coupled with 
the relegation of animal imagery to mass media and the increasingly commonplace 
anthropomorphism of animals in literature and art have profoundly destabilized human 
conceptions of the self. If Berger is to be believed, the incremental disappearance of 
animals from human consciousness and the increasing prevalence of a discourse by 
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which “animals are placed in a receding past” (Berger 1977, 12, italics in original) 
have cemented the alienation of humanity.
Four decades on, few of the symptoms Berger identified in “Why Look at An-
imals?” seem anachronistic. For the typical inhabitant of the 21st-century Western 
megalopolis, spontaneous contact with wild animals is, indeed, exceedingly rare, re-
placed by the carefully orchestrated encounters that are the domain of the zoo and the 
pet store. Berger’s assertion that this physical marginalization of animals is accom-
panied by their exile to the realm of increasingly verisimilar animal imagery (Berger 
1977, 22–23) also finds a referent in the recent colossal advances of digital animation. 
In the years since Berger’s essay, the field has evolved to the point of routinely pro-
ducing computer-generated imagery indistinguishable from real footage, and its labors 
are regularly directed at churning out films aimed at children, featuring anthropomor-
phized animals as protagonists. Little seems to have changed since the 1970s.
On the other hand, the trajectory of literary studies in recent years has provided 
ample reason to reconsider Berger’s diagnoses. I am thinking here of the “animal turn” 
which has fostered the evolution of animal studies, a discipline aimed at, amongst other 
things, interrogating the ontological, ethical, and metaphysical implications of animal 
depictions in literature. Arising out of a broader awareness of the need to acknowledge 
and examine the literary identity and sovereignty of marginalized groups—in a man-
ner analogous to the proliferation of feminist and postcolonial literary studies—animal 
studies wrestles with questions of representation and agency, aiming ultimately to de-
ploy “the best of our imperfect and partial knowledge … [to] enhance the lives of all 
animals, ourselves included” (Weil 2010, 20). This final point is crucial, for, as Kari 
Weil notes,
It has become clear that the idea of “the animal”—instinctive beings with presumably no 
access to language, texts, or abstract thinking—has functioned as an unexamined foundation 
on which the idea of the human and hence the humanities have been built. It has also become 
clear, primarily through advances in a range of scientific studies of animal language, culture, 
and morality, that this exclusion has taken place on false grounds. (Weil 2010, 19)
In this context, Berger’s claims about the ontological implications of marginalizing an-
imals may be subject to considerable revision. Not only does the animal turn evidence 
a renewed attention to animals that claims to bring them out of the periphery, but also 
the very existence of the discipline provides sufficient cause to revise the particulars of 
the “then-and-now” dichotomy that fundamentally underpins Berger’s essay.
Beyond these contextualized misgivings, I would also argue that Berger’s totaliz-
ing assertions in their own right mean that “Why Look at Animals?” must be interpret-
ed with some degree of caution. Discussing Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s analysis of the 
development of language, Berger—who, incidentally, presents language as an infal-
lible criterion of demarcation between humans and animals—rather helpfully makes 
the point that “[t]hose who disagree with Rousseau are contesting a view of man, 
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not a historical fact” (Berger 1977, 8). For reasons that will become apparent shortly, 
I am inclined to apply this reasoning to Berger’s own essay and read his arguments 
as philosophical contentions rather than historically rigorous claims. Motivating my 
decision, first and foremost, is that a significant number of critics have taken issue with 
the historical trajectory of animal-human relationships as presented in “Why Look at 
Animals?”, in several cases even offering alternative readings of history that under-
mine Berger’s conclusions. Jonathan Burt, for instance, suggests that institutionali-
zation, rather than marginalization, constituted the predominant change in human in-
volvement with animal affairs from the 19th century onwards, and that, far from being 
banished, animals as a result gained a newfound significance in human consciousness 
(Burt 2005, 212–13).
My second major reason for treating “Why Look at Animals?” ahistorically is that 
many of Berger’s claims are fundamentally dependent on a variety of anthropocentric 
projections and anthropomorphic imaginings, supplemented by a tone that, at times, 
approaches the mystical. Take, for instance, his description of the animal gaze:
The eyes of an animal when they consider a man are attentive and wary. The same animal 
may well look at other species in the same way. He does not reserve a special look for man… 
The animal scrutinises him across a narrow abyss of non-comprehension. (Berger 1977, 4–5)
It is immediately apparent that Berger is operating with a gross generalization of “an-
imal” when making these rather specific claims, homogenizing a vast biological clade 
which is not only superlatively heterogeneous (a fact which has been common knowl-
edge at least since the 18th-century advent of Linnaean classification, and probably 
since times of antiquity) but also, as has been axiomatic since Darwin, includes the 
very species, humans, that he seeks to exclude from it for the purposes of juxtaposi-
tion. But even leaving this aside and accepting his dichotomy, one may well ask on 
what basis Berger presumes to know the inner workings of the bestial psyche at all, 
what justification he has for concluding anything about an animal’s degree of compre-
hension or the dynamics of the looks it exchanges with other animals. What Berger, in 
a moment of pure conjecture, brushes off as self-evident is quite possibly the most dif-
ficult question animal studies seeks to address: how, given the potential inaccessibility 
of animal cognition, “one can give testimony to an experience that cannot be spoken or 
that may be distorted by speaking it” (Weil 2010, 4). It is difficult to come to any con-
clusion other than that Berger’s rhetorical mode relies greatly on imaginative license; 
as Burt puts it, the essay’s factual claims are “interwoven with a more hypothetical, 
quasi-mythical view of human-animal relations” (Burt 2005, 204) and are used to ad-
vance a “thesis that depends … heavily on a linguistic/textual notion of the symbolic 
animal” (Burt 2005, 214).
Though Burt’s final point was clearly proffered as a criticism of “Why Look at An-
imals?”, the mythical dimension of Berger’s text actually provides a firm foundation 
for considering the essay in relation to literary depictions of interchange, transgression, 
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and conflict at the ethereal animal-human interface. In simultaneously examining and 
enacting the changing nature of human-animal interactions, literature, of course, has no 
choice but to respond to Weil’s question of faithful testimony directly; Akira Lippit’s ob-
servation that “Animals seem to necessitate some form of mediation or allegorization—
some initial transposition to language—before they can be absorbed into and dispersed 
throughout the flow of everyday psychology” (Lippit 2000, 8) rings especially true when 
the transposition is from vague impressions to the certainty of ink on paper. Partly for 
this reason, ethologist Frans de Waal has long argued for a re-examination of the dynam-
ics of anthropomorphism in human thought on animals, suggesting that whilst naive, 
unthinking presumptions of likeness between humans and animals should be avoided, 
so too should what he terms “anthropodenial … the a priori rejection of shared char-
acteristics between humans and animals when in fact they may exist” (De Waal 2001, 
69, italics in original). De Waal thus delineates a precarious edge on which literature in 
particular is obliged to balance, teetering between anthropocentrism on the one hand and 
anthropodenial on the other, but, in spite of this difficulty – or, perhaps, because of it – he 
argues for “breathing space in relation to cognitive interpretations” of animals (De Waal 
2001, 42). This is a concession which, I would suggest, may be fruitfully extended to the 
inscription of these interpretations into literary science fiction, a genre whose capacity 
for insightful social commentary fundamentally depends on the intertwining of paradox-
ical multiplicities and discontinuities.
Multiplicities are crucial to science fiction’s depictions of human-animal interplay, 
in large part because they allow De Waal’s injunctions to be observed in a productive 
manner. Joan Gordon, for instance, reads such depictions through the figure of the 
amborg, a neologism coined to “abandon the decisive and misleading slash of the cum-
bersome mouthful, human/animal interface” (Gordon 2008, 191). Gordon’s amborg 
facilitates mutual subjectivity across that increasingly hazy interface, being a concept 
“that is meant to acknowledge flows more than divisions” (Gordon 2008, 192) but 
with the free admission that in doing so, it becomes “‘multiple, without clear bounda-
ry,’ holding ‘incompatible things together’” (Gordon 2008, 191). The amborg is thus, 
as Gordon puts it, a “hopeful monster,” “meant to allow us to consider humans and 
animals not as separate and mutually exclusive categories but to consider humans as 
one species among many” and intrinsically dependent “upon the acknowledgement of 
similarities” that bring us face-to-face with the “threatening … affinities of the uncan-
ny valley” (Gordon 2016, 254–55). Such a figure, laden with the paradoxical dynamics 
of interconnection between the human and animal worlds, can only exist in science 
fiction; its tenability is facilitated by the genre’s capacity to stimulate a total displace-
ment of the reader’s subjectivity, what Sherryl Vint calls a “‘sympathetic imagination’ 
[which] is perhaps a necessary balance to the philosophical and scientific traditions of 
investigating animal-being” (Vint 2008, 179).
Questions surrounding the depiction of the human-animal interface in science fic-
tion, of course, rest firmly within the purview of animal studies, and carefully consid-
ering the literary interplay of Berger’s conclusions offers insights into the challenging 
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questions of trauma, representation, and self-conception that the field examines. Con-
sequently, my intention here is to evaluate the model of human-animal interactions 
proposed by Berger against two test cases, each of which has been profoundly influen-
tial in shaping the standing and nature of these interactions in the popular conscious-
ness: H. G. Wells’s The Island of Doctor Moreau and Philip K. Dick’s Do Androids 
Dream of Electric Sheep?. Animals feature prominently in both of these science fiction 
novels and their status in each has direct implications for the dynamics of the gaze, the 
tenability of the human/animal ontological dichotomy, and the resultant conceptions 
of human identity. As I will argue, though the rupture between a past of interaction 
and a present of alienation that Berger describes broadly structures the two texts, close 
analysis provides an opportunity to clarify, modify, and refute a number of his finer 
claims. This process of refinement allows us to track conceptions of the human-animal 
interactions through the literary landscape and explore their extrapolations into various 
speculative—dare I say conceivable?—contexts, including the frontiers of science and 
post-apocalyptic worlds.
I. Dialectical encounters, colonial parallels
In the context of identity construction, perhaps the most striking—and, indeed, vi-
sionary—feature of The Island of Doctor Moreau is the manner in which it attempts 
to adopt, but swiftly reveals to be untenable, the capacity for language to function as 
a criterion of demarcation between humans and animals. Such a criterion typically con-
stitutes an ontological necessity in the creation of human identity; as Lippit observes, 
the “effort to define the human being has usually required a preliminary gesture of 
exclusion: a rhetorical animal sacrifice” (Lippit 2000, 8). This is a sacrifice, moreover, 
which, in the Western philosophical tradition, has regularly occurred on a linguistic 
basis: “the consensus [has been] that although animals undoubtedly communicate with 
one another, only human beings convey their subjectivity in speech” (Lippit 2000, 
14). The assumption that language is an exclusively human trait which, as Berger 
puts it, “allows men to reckon with each other as with themselves” (Berger 1977, 5) 
and exclude animals by virtue of this reckoning is one which Prendick, the novel’s 
narrator and focalizer, clearly holds at the outset of The Island of Doctor Moreau. This 
outlook begins to disintegrate, however, when very early in the plot his command of 
linguistic faculties fails to elicit a mutual understanding between three fellow humans. 
Despite repeated appeals and protestations, Prendick finds himself unable to convince 
either the captain of the ship he is on, or Moreau’s assistant Montgomery, to grant him 
refuge, and what follows is an unambiguous defeat of Berger’s ideal for interaction 
between men: “At last, I must confess, my voice suddenly broke in the middle of 
a vigorous threat. I felt a gust of hysterical petulance, and went aft, and stared dismally 
at nothing” (Wells 1896, 51). Prendick’s capitulation here suggests a breakdown of the 
linguistic sign; his signifiers, unable to anchor to their intended signifieds, become un-
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tethered and are cast adrift. In this post-linguistic state, then, the sign ceases to confirm 
the language-based ontological unifier (for humans as a group) and separator (between 
humans and animals). This episode is the first of many to reveal the untenability of 
such a criterion.
As the novel progresses, much more decisive nails land in the coffin of the “lan-
guage is human” outlook with the revelation that Moreau’s animal-human hybrids, 
including those which the Doctor considers to have failed to reach the ideal of human-
ity, have no trouble speaking. “These things—these animals talk!” exclaims Prendick 
(Wells 1896, 96, italics in original), shocked as his assumptions unravel in the presence 
of the irrefutable counterexamples before his very eyes. But more striking, I would 
argue, are the significantly deeper ambiguities in the relation of language to humanity 
which develop when Moreau’s creations actively refuse ontological construction along 
linguistic lines:
“Who are you?” said I. [The Leopard-Man] tried to meet my gaze.
 “No!” he said suddenly, and, turning, went bounding away from me through the
undergrowth. Then he turned and stared at me again. (Wells 1896, 70)
As E. Snyder astutely points out, here the Leopard-Man denies Prendick’s bid to as-
cribe personhood to him,1 and the fact that he does this through language is crucial: 
“In his use of human speech to reject a conception of his humanity, he actively resists 
Prendick’s attempt to place him within a hierarchy of creation, and carves out a mar-
ginal space of his own” (Snyder 2013, 221). This gesture is significant on two fronts. 
Firstly, the rejection inherent in its enactment obliquely hints at what Lippit describes 
as “the possibility that another communicative medium [separate from language] may 
in fact be operative in nature’s animal provocations” (Lippit 2000, 22), a medium per-
haps entirely inaccessible to humans. Secondly, it makes clear that Prendick’s attempt 
at establishing a discourse dependent upon the linguistic superiority of the human fails 
to meet the ideal that Joan Gordon’s amborg suggests for exchange between species: 
“figurative interspecies epigenesis, a feedback relationship resulting not in the speech 
of the subaltern, but in speaking between ‘alterns’” (Gordon 2010, 456). Throughout 
his novel, Wells reveals that the thoroughly ambiguous nature of language precludes 
it from serving effectively and unproblematically as a criterion of ontological demar-
cation. As the hybrids chant their litany at Prendick, the mantra of “Are we not Men?” 
(Wells 1896, 83) ceases to be a rhetorical question. Those four words come to encode 
the entirety of the novel’s ontological anxieties, anxieties situated precisely at the ethe-
real human-animal interface.
In spite of these observations, I wish to suggest that some of Berger’s claims about 
the human-animal dynamic are, in fact, upheld and expounded upon in The Island of 
Doctor Moreau, such as his contention that proximity between the two builds a con-
1  Prendick, note, uses the humanizing “who” rather than the objectifying "what." 
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ception of animals as “both like and unlike” humans (Berger 1977, 4). To do this, 
I need to borrow a theoretical framework from a somewhat unlikely field—postcolo-
nial studies. In fact, this jump from animal studies to the postcolonial is not quite as 
drastic as first it appears, as I have already hinted by quoting Conrad in the epigraph 
to this essay. It is by no accident that Weil, when discussing the problem of represent-
ing animal subjectivity in her overview of the animal turn, thinks of Gayatri Spivak’s 
influential essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (Weil 2010, 3): in terms of power dy-
namics—in discourse and in its enactment—both animals and colonized peoples are 
regularly made to occupy subaltern positions. This is doubly true of Moreau’s hybrids, 
whose subjugation is a product not only of their animality, but also their existence in 
an interstitial space not easily inscribed in the hierarchies of power.
Prendick, as a representative of humanity, shares an uneasy relationship with these 
hybrids which can be fruitfully examined through the lens of mimicry, a concept devel-
oped by postcolonial theorist Homi Bhabha to characterize the instability inherent in 
discursive conceptions of colonized peoples. In othering the colonized, Bhabha argues, 
colonial discourse necessarily inscribes a perceptual volatility in relation to the colo-
nized others it generates. As a consequence, representatives of the colonizing force 
find that perceptions of those others at the point of their contact, be it physical or lit-
erary, rapidly oscillate between recognition through acknowledgement of likeness and 
repulsion through dread of difference, encoded in what Bhabha calls “the twin figures 
of narcissism and paranoia that repeat furiously, uncontrollably” (Bhabha 1984, 132). 
In The Island of Doctor Moreau, precisely this dialectical relationship prevails over 
Prendick’s interactions with the hybrids from the moment he lays eyes on them:
The thing came to me as a stark inhumanity. That black figure, with its eyes of fire, struck 
down through all my adult thoughts and feelings, and for a moment the forgotten horrors of 
childhood came back to my mind. Then the effect passed as it had come. An uncouth black 
figure of a man, a figure of no particular import, hung over the taffrail … (Wells 1896, 49)
As Bhabha puts it, this is an “ambivalence” which “repeatedly turns from mimic-
ry—a difference that is almost nothing but not quite—to menace—a difference that is 
almost total but not quite” (Bhabha 1984, 132, italics in original). Prendick’s othering 
of the hybrids, in other words, is not and cannot ever be complete, forcing a dialec-
tic which threatens assumptions of the ontological exclusivity (and, by extension, the 
purported superiority) of the human. Incidentally, the exploitation of animals in the 
pursuit of scientific research, both within the confines of the novel and beyond, is un-
derpinned by a similarly paradoxical circumstance, as such exploitation “requires that 
we hold the contradictory beliefs that animals are sufficiently like humans to provide 
useful biological matter, yet sufficiently unlike us that their slaughter in these pursuits 
is not an ethical issue” (Vint 2008, 178, italics in original). In highlighting Prendick’s 
response to the hybrids and situating it within the broader framework of scientific ex-
perimentation, The Island of Doctor Moreau develops and clarifies the precise nature 
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of a dynamic that Berger would later characterize as recognition of the simultaneous 
likeness and unlikeness of animals (Berger 1977, 4), a recognition which, on Berger’s 
view, ostensibly underpins human-animal interactions.
Having been published at the turn of the 20th century, Wells’s novel is, of course, 
far removed from the times of antiquity Berger has in mind when describing a past in 
which “animals constituted the first circle of what surrounded man” (Berger 1977, 3). 
As I have argued, however, the animal-human interplay is foregrounded in The Island 
of Doctor Moreau as an intertwined network of ontological ambiguities that can only 
be addressed through a series of sustained interactions. In Berger’s model of the pres-
ent, such interactions are foreclosed in principle. It is with his conception of the past, 
then, as a time of proximity and mutual reckoning between humans and animals, that 
The Island of Doctor Moreau more closely aligns.
II. Animals, empathy, and commodification
If Berger’s model of the past finds a degree of confirmation in the world of The Is-
land of Doctor Moreau, then Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, set in a distant, 
post-apocalyptic future, may well come to exemplify the second half of the dichotomy 
that “Why Look at Animals?” describes—an increasingly alienating present in which 
animals have been banished from human consciousness. In fact, unsettlingly, the novel 
presents a world whose conditions can conceivably be seen as arising directly out of 
the historical trajectory Berger tracked in his essay. Berger’s claim, of course, was that 
mass-industrialization followed by the advent of corporate capitalism brought about 
the marginalization of animals; Dick presents a further horrifying step in this process, 
a barren world bearing the scars of civilization, torn apart by capitalist greed, relentless 
violence, and environmental pollution, devoid almost entirely of animal life due to 
the mass-extinction of species. To an extreme and literal degree, interactions between 
animals and humans are driven by the former’s almost total absence, backgrounded 
by a disturbing landscape whose ethos remains recognizable in Lippit’s description 
of modernity as “defined by the disappearance of wildlife from humanity’s habitat 
and by the reappearance of the same in humanity’s reflections on itself” (Lippit 2000, 
2–3). In such as world, as Lippit puts it, the status of the animal “has shifted … from 
a metaphysic to a phantasm; from a body to an image; from a living voice to a techni-
cal echo”, though this “disappearance does not release [animals] from their bond with 
human beings in a human world. Even as absent beings, animals accompany the crisis 
in human ontology” (Lippit 2000, 22, 20).
The matter of human-animal relations in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, 
however, is complicated somewhat by the existence of two kinds of machines: the 
eponymous androids whose presence drives the plot, and the mechanized substitutes 
for animals that are kept as inferior pets by the inhabitants of Dick’s world. The ex-
istence of androids intervenes upon the power dynamics typically underpinning hu-
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man-animal interactions: as Vint observes, the novel “[i]n many ways … simply puts 
androids in the place historically occupied by animals” (Vint 2007, 113)—a place, that 
is, of ontological inferiority. There is also a significant correspondence to be noted be-
tween Moreau’s hybrids and Dick’s androids: both are liminal groups, seen as almost, 
but not quite, human. The android, that is, problematizes its interface with the organic 
being in a manner entirely reflecting the ambiguities of human-animal interactions; 
Gordon’s amborg, coined to capture the dissipation of the latter boundary, was formu-
lated as a parallel to Haraway’s cyborg, being the embodiment of the former’s dissolu-
tion (Gordon 2008, 190). But equally, though humanity’s relations to the machine and 
to the animal have much in common, we should not forget that androids exist along-
side, rather than in lieu of, animals in the text. Nor are animals replaced entirely by 
their mechanical counterparts; though the artificial versions are sufficiently advanced 
to be almost indistinguishable in appearance from the real thing, Dick’s characters take 
great pains to stress their inferiority in comparison to organic animals. Considering the 
nature of specifically human-animal interactions in Do Androids Dream of Electric 
Sheep?, as well as the precise influence the mechanical versions have on these interac-
tions, reveals insights into the novel’s outlook on both groups.
The most prevalent roles that animals play in the world of Do Androids Dream 
of Electric Sheep? are invariably associated with sustaining that world’s criterion of 
demarcation between human and non-human—not language, in this case, but rather 
the capacity for empathy. To start with a relatively utilitarian function, animals serve 
as the basis of most content in the Voigt-Kampff test, by which bounty hunters like 
Deckard, the novel’s protagonist, purport to distinguish androids from true humans. 
The principle is relatively straightforward: test subjects are made to imagine a vari-
ety of distressing scenarios and their physiological responses are measured. The test 
operates on the assumption that only a human will be able to truly empathize with the 
entity in each scenario and experience quantifiable distress. Overwhelmingly, these 
scenarios, aimed at evoking horror or disgust, involve the killing of animals and their 
consumption as food or commercial goods—“a calf-skin wallet,” a “bearskin rug,” 
boiling lobster at a restaurant, “guests enjoying raw oysters” (Dick 1968, 42–45). Of 
particular note here is Donald Palumbo’s axiomatic observation that these “stimuli … 
would not, in all but one or two instances, elicit any such reaction from ordinary peo-
ple in the real world” (Palumbo 2013, 1277). Why, then, are they so potent in Dick’s 
futuristic society?
A tempting explanation is that this is a collective compensatory mechanism: in 
a world where most animals have been made extinct (Dick 1968, 38), humans have 
increased their sensitivity to the sufferings of animals in an attempt to forestall their 
complete disappearance, from the mind as well as the barren Earth. I would argue, 
however, that Berger offers an alternative and more compelling assessment. “One 
could suppose that such innovations,” he says of zoos, animal toys, and other modern 
emphases on animals, “were compensatory. Yet in reality the innovations themselves 
belonged to the same remorseless movement as was dispersing the animals” (Berger 
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1977, 26). In making animals the objects of their putative empathy, that is, the inhabit-
ants of Dick’s world actually conspire to marginalize them ever further.
Nowhere is this clearer than in the keeping of animals in Do Androids Dream of 
Electric Sheep?, a socially-mandated activity: “You know how people are about not 
taking care of an animal; they consider it immoral and anti-empathic,” Deckard’s 
neighbor Bill reminds him (Dick 1968, 15). Providing for an animal’s needs is intended 
as an exercise in empathy and thus serves as a kind of perpetual ontological self-con-
struction but underlying this is a rather sinister dynamic. Animals, after all, are not 
seen as capable of returning empathy; so, forcibly confining them and caring for their 
needs becomes little more than an asymmetrical power play on the part of the human. 
This asymmetry has a profound consequence: where animals and humans might once 
have scrutinized one another “across a narrow abyss of non-comprehension” (Berger 
1977, 5), now there is no abyss to even speak of, for such mutual exchange of gazes 
demands an equal (or at least, independent) footing that has been totally eradicated.
Though animals feature prominently in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, 
their capacity as subjects is almost never mentioned. Only a handful of times, such as 
when Mrs. Pilsen says that her kitten used to “stand and stare at us as if asking a ques-
tion” (Dick 1968, 68) or when Deckard’s goat is described as “regard[ing] him with 
bright-eyed perspicacity” (Dick 1968, 141) does the novel offer any glimmer of hope 
of returning to a past when animals could be regarded as enigmatic vessels of inacces-
sible knowledge. But these sparks are quickly extinguished. The overwhelming major-
ity of dialogue surrounding animals in the novel concerns either the dynamics of the 
human objectifying gaze, or else questions of commercial value—one might recall the 
diligence with which Deckard consults his Sidney’s Catalogue any time an animal is 
mentioned. As has been repeatedly argued, animals are entirely transformed into com-
modities in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (Vint 2007, 116; Vinci 2014, 100) 
and for the average inhabitant of Dick’s world, altering the nature of this relationship is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible.2 Clearly, then, empathy as such does not underlie 
human-animal interactions in the novel, and for precisely this reason, Berger’s charac-
terization of pets in the modern world is not quite reflected in Do Androids Dream of 
Electric Sheep?. “The pet completes [the owner], offering responses to aspects of his 
character which would otherwise remain unconfirmed,” Berger argues (Berger 1977, 
14, italics in original), but as I have shown, despite what the novel’s characters may 
believe, the animals in their care do not and cannot confirm their owner’s capacity for 
empathy. Whether this threatens the former’s ontological status as humans remains an 
open question.
Thus far, I have ignored possibly the most obvious counter-example to the claims 
I have just made: John Isidore, one of the few characters in the novel whose interaction 
with animals does not depend on their commodification, and the only one who can rea-
2  An exception, of course, is John Isidore, whose relationship with animals is certainly not centered 
on the commercial. I will consider Isidore specifically later in this essay.
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sonably be said to achieve the state of empathy that Dick’s society so fervently extolls. 
The fact that Isidore’s relation to animals is fundamentally different from that of the 
other characters is underscored throughout the text, but nowhere is it more apparent 
than near the end of the novel, where Pris and the other androids sit with Isidore in his 
apartment. In one of the novel’s more disturbing scenes, Isidore watches, helpless, as 
Pris tortures a spider before him by cutting off its legs:
“I was right,” Irmgard said. “Didn’t I say it could walk with only four legs?” She peered up 
expectantly at Isidore. “What’s the matter?” Touching his arm she said, “You didn’t lose an-
ything; we’ll pay you what that—what’s it called?—that Sidney’s catalogue says. Don’t look 
so grim… .” She prodded him anxiously.
… 
 Pris, with the scissors, cut yet another leg from the spider. All at once John Isidore pushed 
her away and lifted up the mutilated creature. He carried it to the sink and there he drowned 
it. In him, his mind, his hopes, drowned, too. As swiftly as the spider. (Dick 1968, 174–75)
The scene is striking not least of all because of the gulf of mutual incomprehensibility 
separating Isidore from the others: the androids, in construing the value of the spider 
purely in commercial terms, seem unable to fathom why Isidore cannot do the same. 
Isidore, in turn, is horrified into utter silence by the androids’ wanton cruelty to the 
creature. His inability to interact with animals in the same ways and on the same as-
sumptions as the other inhabitants of Dick’s world make Isidore, as Palumbo argues, 
“the most sympathetic and apparently ‘human’ … character in the novel” (Palumbo 
2013, 1279). If there is a figure who best exemplifies the ideals and possibilities af-
forded by Gordon’s amborg, whose relation to the animal world marks out a tentative 
track “to revalidate the embodied physical human being” (Gordon 2008, 190), it is Isi-
dore. He, perhaps, signifies the faint possibility of a return to something approximating 
Berger’s description of the distant past: a state where the human relation to animals is 
driven by mutual acknowledgement of equality and respect, rather than a protracted 
campaign to hold dominion over animals. It seems to me, however, that Isidore’s status 
in the society he inhabits forecloses this possibility fairly unambiguously. Suffering 
from radiation-induced intellectual deficiency, Isidore has been designated a “chicken-
head” (Dick 1968, 19) and consequently, like the animals, finds himself marginalized 
in society—which, incidentally, also provides a possible explanation of his readiness 
to empathize with them. On this basis, coupled with the fact that he represents an out-
lier in the general trend of human-animal interactions in the novel, Isidore is unlikely 
to exert any social influence on the overarching nature of these interactions. 
To conclude, I wish to briefly dwell on the status of mechanical animals in Do An-
droids Dream of Electric Sheep? and consider the ways in which their existence influences 
the relationship between animals and humans. The mechanized creatures are, of course, 
the animal equivalent of androids, indistinguishable from organic animals in every way 
barring a minuscule control panel hidden on the body. Their creation and sale as surrogate 
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pets, replacements for the countless species driven from the Earth and the consciousness 
by extinction, finds a striking referent in Berger’s characterization of increasingly realistic 
animal imagery—his specific example is children’s toys—as a key stage in the marginali-
zation of animals, the substitution of wild encounters by domestic replicas:
In the preceding centuries, the proportion of toys which were animal, was small. And these 
did not pretend to realism, but were symbolic. The difference was that between a traditional 
hobby horse and a rocking horse: the first was merely a stick with a rudimentary head which 
children rode like a broom handle: the second was an elaborate “reproduction” of a horse, 
painted realistically, with real reins of leather, a real mane of hair, and designed movement to 
resemble that of a horse galloping. The rocking horse was a 19th century invention.
 This new demand for verisimilitude in animal toys led to different methods of manufacture. 
The first stuffed animals were produced, and the most expensive were covered with real ani-
mal skin … (Berger 1977, 22–23)
It does not take a particularly large imaginative leap to proceed from the phenome-
non Berger is describing here to the manufacture of near-perfect animal surrogates to 
stand in for the inaccessible real thing. Following this trajectory, however, necessitates 
accepting another of Berger’s implicit distinctions: that between living organism and 
artificial machine. In his case, where the contrast is between a real horse and a wooden 
toy, the separation can be made intuitively and without controversy, but in the context 
of mechanical animals so lifelike that they are regularly mistaken for their organic 
counterparts, the precise placement of the dividing line—and, indeed, its very exist-
ence—proves to be a serious ontological problem.
Much in the same way as the inhabitants of Dick’s world assume a clear and natural 
distinction between human and android, the separation of mechanical animal and real 
animal into two ontological classes constitutes an unthinking presumption for most of 
the characters in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?. In fact, Isidore’s expression 
of empathy for the mechanized creatures is taken to be evidence of his failing mental 
acuity: “‘I don’t think Isidore can tell the difference,’ Milt said mildly. ‘To him they’re 
all alive, false animals included. He probably tried to save [the mechanical cat]’” (Dick 
1968, 66). But in establishing him as the novel’s only sympathetic character, Dick 
casts doubt on this very distinction, and by the end of the novel some of Isidore’s 
thinking even rubs off on Deckard, who acknowledges that “The electric things have 
their lives, too. Paltry as those lives are” (Dick 1968, 199). Perhaps, then, much like 
the way in which the advent of animal studies has hinged on acknowledging the ab-
sence of a clear ontological boundary between human and animal, reconsidering the 
presumption of an equivalent boundary between the living and the machine can be 
a fruitful endeavor. This, in fact, was the famous central claim of Donna Haraway’s 
“A Cyborg Manifesto,” that “we are all chimeras, theorized, and fabricated hybrids of 
machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs” (Haraway 1985, 118).
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“Why Look at Animals?” has thus proven to be a useful touchstone for the ani-
mal-human dynamic in The Island of Doctor Moreau and Do Androids Dream of Elec-
tric Sheep?. In a very broad sense, these novels align with Berger’s dichotomy of past 
and present respectively: where The Island of Doctor Moreau foregrounds interactions 
between animal and human in its interrogation of the nature of each, Do Androids 
Dream of Electric Sheep? demonstrates such interactions to be in a state of near-total 
collapse. On the finer level, however, Berger’s linguistic criterion of human demarca-
tion, his conception of animals as like and unlike humans, and his characterization of 
the status of pets, amongst other particular claims, are refuted, clarified, and developed 
in considering his essay alongside the imaginings of science fiction. 
In examining the interplay between science fiction and the social consequences of 
human enterprise, Nancy Kress has argued for a view of the genre as an intensely po-
tent adjunct to the practical workings of science, a way of anchoring scientific activity 
to the imaginative consciousness. “In the world’s laboratories,” she writes, “science 
rehearses advances in theory and application. In fiction, SF writers rehearse the human 
implications of those advances” (Kress 2007, 207). As the increasing traction gained 
by animal studies in recent years has repeatedly reminded us, however, these impli-
cations are never just human, and the changing ways in which we structure our lives 
and societies inscribe novel interrelations between humanity, nature, animals, and life 
itself. In an era of unprecedented ecological disruption, environmental change, and 
mass-extinction of species in the wake of human activity, the nexus between science 
fiction and animal studies is more vital and more productive than ever. Careful consid-
eration of the interactions between humans and animals as depicted in literary science 
fiction has the potential to foster new understandings of humanity’s place amongst the 
vast network of life on a rapidly changing Earth, and of the shifting roles and obliga-
tions that occupying such a place entails. 
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